The Carruthers Report - A Critical Evaluation by Hasson, Reuben A.
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship
1976
The Carruthers Report - A Critical Evaluation
Reuben A. Hasson
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Hasson, Reuben A. "The Carruthers Report - A Critical Evaluation." Canadian Business Law Journal 1.4 (1976): 416-434.
THE CARRUTHERS REPORT-
A CRITICAL EVALUATION
Reuben A. Hasson*
If the quality of a report determined whether it deserved critical at-
tention the Carruthers Report1 would assuredly not be commented on.
However, since the Report considered a crucially important area of
public policy, i.e., the regulation of the insurance industry,' it is very
important that its proposals should be examined, particularly since the
proposals made might serve as the basis for future legislative action. It
is my contention that the Report's recommendations are very seriously
flawed and that a fresh beginning needs to be made. I will discuss the
Report under four headings:
1. Revision of the Insurance Act;
2. The Regulation of Intermediaries;
3. Price Disclosure in Insurance; and
4. The Use of Arbitration to Solve Insurance Disputes.
Before dealing in detail with each of these headings, it is necessary
to point out that the Report is woefully short on scholarship. The au-
thor states that he has examined inter alia, legislation in the United
States, United Kingdom, Australia, West Germany and France, but
there is not a single reference to the laws of these (or any other) coun-
tries in the body of the Report. There are passing references to two
books3 and there is no mention of the outstanding contributions made
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
Report on Insurance Study submitted to the Superintendent of Insurance, Ministry of Con-
sumer and Commercial Relations, Ontario, by Douglas H. Carruthers, Q.C., 4 vols. (Toronto,
1973-75). Hereinafter referred to as "Report" followed by the relevant number of the vol-
ume.
2 Premium income for the insurance industry in Ontario was in excess of two billion dollars in
1972; see Report, vol. 3, at p. 18.
E. P. Neufeld, The Financial System of Canada (Toronto, Macmillan, 1972); G. D. Quirin,
Competition, Economic Efficiency and Profitability in the Canadian Property and Casualty In-
surance Industry (Toronto, 1974).
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by such scholars as Professors Belth, 4 Kimball, 5 Dennenberg.6 There
is no reference to even helpful popular books, such as J. J. Brown's
Life Insurance - Benefit or Fraud?7 and Ellen Roseman's chapter,
"Life Insurance: Tyranny of the Experts", in her book Consumer
Beware! - A Guidebook to Consumer Rights and Remedies in Can-
ada. 8
1. Revision of the Insurance Act
The author states that it is not his intention to deal with (a) problems
of automobile insurance since a revision of this part of the Act is al-
ready under consideration by the department, and (b) sections which
are "complex". 9 The former limitation is understandable but the ratio-
nale for the latter one is impossible to fathom. At the least, areas of
complexity should have been identified and possible directions of re-
form should have been indicated. I shall be selective in my comments
on this part of the Report's recommendations, in order to keep this
comment within a manageable length.
The author points out that s. 87 of the Insurance Act (R.S.O. 1970,
c. 224) provides that anyone may place insurance with an unlicensed
fire insurer and he wonders why there is a special section dealing with
unlicensed fire insurers. Attention should also be drawn to s. 349
which provides that an agent or broker is personally liable to the in-
sured, if either places insurance with an unlicensed insurer. These two
sections, read together, suggest that an unlicensed insurer (other than a
fire insurer) might be able to resist a claim on the ground that it was un-
licensed. That this is not a fanciful fear is shown by the horrific deci-
sion of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Ames v. Investo-Plan
Ltd. 1 I Clearly, what is needed is an express section providing that an
4 In addition to numerous articles, special mention should be made of Professor Belth's Life In-
surance: A Consumers' Handbook (Bloomington, Indiana, Univ. Press, 1973).
5 See especially his Essays in Insurance Regulation (Ann Arbor, 1966) and Insurance, Govern-
ment, and Social Policy, co-editor Professor H. Dennenberg (Homewood, Ill., S.S. Huebner
Foundation for Insurance Education, 1969).
6 See especially his Shoppers' Guide to Life Insurance (Pennsylvania Insurance Commission,
1972).
(Toronto, Longmans Canada Ltd., 1972).
(Toronto, New Press, 1973).
"There are other sections in the Act not considered here because of their complexity". See Re-
port, vol. 2, p. 2.
10 (1973), 35 D.L.R. (3d) 613, [1973] 5 W.W.R. 451 (purchaser who bought from unlicensed
dealer in securities denied rescission). The decision has been trenchantly criticized by my col-
league Professor Beck in "Comments", 52 Can. Bar Rev. 589 (1974).
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unlicensed insurer is liable to the insured on the same footing as a li-
censed insurer.
This difference between fire insurance and other kinds of insurance
recurs several times in the Insurance Act but the Report offers no com-
ment on these anomalous distinctions. To mention three examples,
consider first, s. 125(b) of the Insurance Act which provides that an
"exclusion, stipulation, condition or warranty is not binding upon the
insured, if it is held to be unjust or unreasonable by the court before
which a question relating thereto is tried". 1 In no other field of insur-
ance can the courts exercise a similar power. This leads to some sur-
prising results. Thus, for example, a clause in an insurance policy
which provided that the insurer was not to be liable if premises were
"unoccupied for more than 96 hours" would be struck down as being
unreasonable if the insured claimed in respect of a fire loss but the in-
sured would get no relief if the loss occurred through theft, storm dam-
age, etc. 12 It is difficult to see any rationality in this distinction.
Second, before a fire insurer can avoid a policy for non-disclosure,
it must prove that the insured was guilty of fraud and "fraud" in this
context, has been interpreted strictly. 13 The effect of requiring fraud
has been, for practical purposes, to remove the duty of disclosure from
the realm of fire insurance. In other fields of insurance, for example,
life, 14 automobile,1 5 and accident and sickness insurance, 6 the insurer
does not have to show that the insured acted fraudulently. 17 Again, it
' For judicial interpretations of this section see e.g., Bobrowski v. Canadian Fire Insurance Co.
(1962), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 127, 39 W.W.R. 351 (Sask. C.A.), affd[ 1963] S.C.R. v, 42 D.L.R.
(2d) 319, 45 W.W.R. 443; Nahayowski v. Pearl Insurance Co. (1964), 45 W.W.R. 662 (Alta.
S.C.).
12 The courts might be able to give the insured relief in this situation by straining the meaning of
"unoccupied"; See in this connection, the opinion of Justice Traynor for the Supreme Court of
California in Foley v. Sonoma County Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 232, 115 P
2d 1 (1941).
' The clearest statement of this principle is by Chief Justice Duff, giving the decision of the Su-
preme Court of Canada, in Taylor v. London Assurance Corp., [1935] S.C.R. 422, [1935] 3
D.L.R. 129, 2 I.L.R. 252.
14 R.S.O. 1970, c. 224, s. 157.
I5lbid., s. 204(a)(ii).
16 Ibid., s. 257.
17 This anomaly has troubled at least one other commentator; see Comment by Heighington, 34
Can. Bar Rev. 93 (1956).
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seems to be impossible to provide a satisfactory rationale for treating
the cases differently.1 8
Third, the law relating to subrogation is different in fire (and auto-
mobile1 9) insurance from subrogation as it is applied in other branches
of insurance. Under the ordinary law of insurance, if an insured is
under-insured and suffers a loss, he (the insured) will be able to main-
tain an action against the tortfeasor and the insured is entitled to be
fully indemnified before handing over any excess amount recovered to
the insurer.2" In the event of a loss being sustained by fire, however,
s. 126(2) provides that in a case of under-insurance the insurer has car-
riage of the subrogation action and "where the net amount recovered,
after deducting the costs of recovery, is not sufficient to provide a
complete indemnity for the loss or damage suffered, that amount shall
be divided between the insurer and the insured in the proportions in
which the loss or damage has been borne by them respectively." 21 It
would be intriguing to know why fire insurance is treated differently
from other kinds of insurance. The Report does not seem to have no-
ticed such anomalies, although one of its stated aims was to remove
anomalies.
The Report then deals with s. 98(5) of the Insurance Act which pro-
vides that an insurer may not avoid a policy unless there has been a ma-
terial misrepresentation of fact in the application for insurance. The
Report poses the question why by s. 98(6) this section is deemed to be
inapplicable to contracts of automobile insurance and concludes by
stating that the question of materiality is dealt with in the part of the
Act dealing with automobile insurance. 22 Unfortunately, this is incor-
rect. Section 204 of the Act - the section dealing with automobile in-
surance - does not contain any mention of materiality and the Ontario
Court of Appeal has held that an insurer may avoid an automobile pol-
s The fact that there is a broad duty of disclosure in insurance law generally and a very narrow
one in fire insurance does not mean that the fire insurance rule is wrong. I have argued, else-
where, that the duty of disclosure in the general law of insurance is too broad and should be re-
stricted; see R. A. Hasson, "The Doctrine of Uberrima Fides in Insurance Law -A Critical
Evaluation", 32 Mod.L.R. 615 (1969).
19 R.S.O. 1970, c. 224, s. 240.
20 This proposition has recently been restated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ledingham v.
Ontario Hospital Services Commission, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 332, 2 N.R. 32, 46 D.L.R. (3d)
699.
21 Compare this with the common law rule as stated in Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. True-
dell, [1927] 2 D.L.R. 659, 60 O.L.R. 227 (App. Div.).
22 Report, vol. 2, p. 28.
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icy without having to prove that the misrepresentation made was mate-
rial. 23
The Report then expresses unhappiness with the wording of s. 106
of the Act which provides that where an accident victim has failed to
recover against an insured, the accident victim may bring an action
against the insurer but he (the accident victim) is "subject to the same
equities as the insurer would have if the judgment had been satis-
fied."12 4 The word that causes Mr. Carruthers difficulty is "equities"
about which the author says "I am not sure that it has any meaning in
law". 2 5 But, despite this statement, the author is able to work out that
"What really is intended by the use of the word 'equities' is to put the
judgment creditor in the same position as the insured, no higher or no
lower, in dealing with the insurer in a claim under its policy". 26 Per-
haps "defences" would be a better term than "equities" but all of the
above misses the real point and difficulty with the section. In an auto-
mobile liability policy, an insurer cannot set up as a defence against the
judgment creditor: - "any act or default of the insured before or after
that event in contravention of this Part or of the terms of the con-
tract".2 7 It is extremely difficult to see why an insurer can raise de-
fences, such as, for example, misrepresentation and non-disclosure to
defeat an accident victim's rights in the case of an ordinary liability
policy, when it is expressly forbidden to do so in the case of automo-
bile insurance policies.
The Report also expresses its dissatisfaction with s. 114 of the In-
surance Act which provides that "Any licensed insurer that discrimi-
nates unfairly between risks in Ontario because of the race or religion
of the insured is guilty of an offence." The Report states "I do not
know how anyone can discriminate unfairly. So to provide, suggests
that one can discriminate fairly in matters of race or religion". 2 8 This
matter requires fuller discussion. There is aprimafacie case for mak-
ing Blacks and Indians pay more for life insurance if the life expec-
tancy of these groups is lower than that of the general population but
the problem with such a classification is that it is too crude. The matter
has been put very well by Professor Kimball:
23 SeeSleigh v. Stevenson, [1943] 4 D.L.R. 433 [1943] O.W.N. 465, 10 I.L.R. 287 (C.A.).
24 Although this rule is stated in a statutory provision, it is essentially a restatement of the com-
mon law rule.
25 Report, vol. 2, p. 29.
26 Ibid.
27 See s. 225(4)(b).
28 Report, vol. 2, p. 30.
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Negroes have often, for example, been "rated up" in life insurance, based on
the undeniable fact that mortality experience for all Negroes is less favorable
than experience for all whites. It requires little sophistication to appreciate the
danger in using these categories . . . . While reliance on the race classification
will protect the company, the classification is too crude, for it sweeps within the
disfavored class many who should receive more favorable treatment. A desire to
eliminate this particular inequity as in conflict with fundamental moral notions
about equal treatment of races has led to statutes forbidding the use of race as a
classification. 29
It is necessary not only to penalize a company which uses a racial
classification to increase an insured's rates but it is also essential to
give the court power to rewrite the contract for the future and to order
the repayment of extra premiums which have been paid by the in-
sured.
The Report also has great difficulty with the interpretation of s. 118
which defines what losses are to be regarded as having been caused by
"fire". The section states what losses are not to be treated as fire
losses. Thus, if goods are damaged as a result of "their undergoing
any process involving the application of heat", 3° that is not a loss
caused by fire. However, the section provides that an insurer can agree
to give "extended insurance". 31 The Report states that it does not
know what "extended insurance" means. 32 All that is meant, surely,
is that an insurer can cover a loss falling outside the definition of
"fire" under s. 118(1). The Report would have been on stronger
ground if it had recommended the abolition of the distinction between
"friendly" and "hostile" fires-a distinction that does not exist in the
Act but which is one that has been constructed by the courts. 33 Again,
it should be made clear that damage caused by smoke following a fire
is covered by the definition of "fire". 34
The Report also misunderstands the function of s. 154(1) of the Act
29 See his article, "The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of
Insurance Law", 45 Minn. L. Rev. 411 (1961), at p. 496. The article is reproduced, in
abridged form in Kimball, Essays in Insurance Regulation (Ann Arbor, 1966).
30 S. ll8(l~a)(i).
31 S. 118(4).
32 See Report, vol. 2, p. 31 ("As it [the sectiorn now stands, I do not know what it means").
33 See, e.g., Young v. Waterloo Mutual Fire Insurance Co., [1955)5 D.L.R. 35, [1955] O.W.N.
868, [1955] I.L.R. 952 (Co. Ct.). The Working Paper on the reform of fire insurance legisla-
tion in Manitoba prepared by the Manitoba Law Reform Commission suggested that this dis-
tinction be abolished; see chapter II of the Working Paper, pp. 9-17.
3' Since "friendly" fires are not within the definition of "fire", it would seem to follow that
smoke damage resulting from a "friendly" fire would not be covered..
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which provides that a life insurance policy does not take effect unless
the policy is delivered to the insured and payment of the first premium
is made to the insurer. In addition, the insured must show that no
change has taken place in his insurability between the time the applica-
tion was completed and the time the policy was delivered. These cu-
mulative requirements are very formidable and the opening words of
s. 154 provides that: - "Subject to any provision to the contrary in
the application or the policy, a contract does not take effect .... "
These words allow for insurance cover to be pre-dated so that the in-
sured does not have to comply with the three conditions stated above.
Incredibly, the Report recommends that these words should be re-
moved from the section. If the Report had recommended that these
words be redrafted so as to allow only for pre-dating of the policy,
there would be some merit in the proposal but the proposed change, as
it stands, is nothing short of absurd. It is suggested that the require-
ment that the insured prove his continued insurability between the time
of application and the time the policy is delivered is an unreasonable
one and should be removed. It is unreasonable enough that the insured
should be held to have warranted he was in good health at the time of
the application whether or not he knew (or had reason) to know that
that was not the case. To require the insured to warrant his good health
for a further unlimited period of time seems unconscionable. 3 5
The Report suggests, in dealing with insurance agents, that although
an agent has to be a "suitable" person under s. 342 of the Act, there
are no guidelines for determining whether an applicant is a "suitable"
person. This is incorrect. Regulation 539 sets out in the greatest detail
factors to be taken into account in determining whether an applicant
should be given an agent's licence. 36 What is remarkable is that the li-
censing requirements for brokers (and adjusters) seem to be far more
lax than they are for agents. Thus, an agent must pass "a qualification
examination as set by the Superintendent ' 37 and he must not be in a
position where he can "offer inducement or use coercion or undue in-
fluence in order to control, direct or secure insurance business". 31
5 The problem may be a particularly difficult one since Canadian courts have not imposed an ob-
ligation on insurers to process applications for life insurance promptly. The vast majority of
American jurisdictions recognize the existence of such a duty; see e.g., Duffy v. Bankers' Life
Ass'n of Des Moines, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913) (recognizing the existence of a duty
in tort) and American Life Ins. Co. of Alabama v. Hutcheson, 109 F.2d 424 (6th Cir. 1940)
recognizing a right to recover on the basis of acceptance by silence).
36 Regulation 539 as amended by 0. Reg. 281/71.
11 See s. 4(l)d) of Reg. 539.
38 See s. 4(2) of Reg. 539.
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Further, a prospective agent must show that he has had a satisfactory
business and employment record. 3 9 By way of contrast, all that the
broker need do to obtain a licence is to state his occupation for the pre-
ceding five years and "furnish a statement as to his trustworthiness and
competency signed by at least three reputable persons resident in On-
tario. ", 40 It is impossible to understand why the qualifications required
of a broker should be lower than those required of agents. What is even
more ludicrous is that these minimal regulatory requirements can be
avoided by someone who describes himself as a "consultant". 41 A
consultant does not have to pass any examinations or obtain the signa-
tures of "three reputable persons in Ontario" or meet any other re-
quirement. This is because a consultant does not solicit or negotiate
contracts of insurance; he merely "advises" clients as to their insur-
ance needs and an insurance adviser does not have to obtain a licence
of any kind. The Carruthers Report was of the opinion that: "Insurance
consulting is a legitimate and necessary service providing there is the
requisite independence". 4 2 Independence from an insurance company
is to be shown by the fact that "the consultant [is to] be paid only by
the client' '.4 It is suggested that this kind of independence is not
enough. Since the line between "advising" on insurance matters on
the one hand and "soliciting and negotiating" on the other is an ex-
ceedingly fine one, consultants should be required to satisfy tests of
competence and integrity.
The Report also has difficulty with s. 344(7) which provides in part
that "a broker shall not be presumed to be the agent of the insurer or
the agent of the insured by reason of the issue to him of a licence under
this section." The Report comments on this section: - "This section
does not make much sense to me. In fact I cannot determine the pur-
pose it is intended to serve". 4 4 The purpose of the subsection is to
counter dicta in English cases which suggest that when a broker acts
for the insured, he is to be regarded as the insured's agent rather than
the insurer's agent.4 5 The virtue of this subsection is that it directs the
39 See s. 4 (1)(c) of Reg. 539.
40 See s. 344(2), R.S.O. 1970, c. 224.
4' According to the Report there may be between 25 and 45 such consultants; See Report, vol. 3,
p. 23.
42 Report, vol. 3, p. 67.
4' Report, vol. 3, p. 66.
4 Report, vol. 2, p. 43.
4 See e.g., Anglo-African Merchants Ltd. v. Bayley, [1970] 1 Q.B. 311; O'Connor v. Kirby,
[1971] 2 All E.R. 1415, [1971] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 454 (C.A.).
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courts that there is no such absolute rule and that, in certain cases, the
broker may be acting as the insurer's agent. 46
For myself, I think the purpose of the subsection is best achieved by
amending s. 197 of the Insurance Act which at present provides: -
197. No officer, agent or employee of an insurer and no person soliciting in-
surance, whether or not he is an agent of the insurer, shall, to the prejudice of the
insured, be deemed to be the agent of the insured in respect of any question aris-
ing out of a contract.
I would amend this section in two ways. First, I would make it applic-
able to all classes of insurance, instead of limiting it, as at present, to
life insurance. 47 Second, I would add the word "broker" after the
opening words of the section "No officer or agent". This change
makes sense since agents and brokers do the same work and, indeed, it
is possible for an agent to call himself a broker as well without satisfy-
ing any additional requirements. 48
I have not listed all the sections with which the Report has dealt in
an unsatisfactory manner, 49 but enough has been said to show that the
proposed amendments to the Insurance Act have not been carefully
thought out and some of the proposed changes would be mischievous
in their effect.
The Report also accepts certain abuses unquestioningly. For exam-
ple, it seems to accept, without question, the power of insurance com-
panies to cancel policies without any reason being given.50 Also, there
46 In Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Okanagan Mainline Real Estate Board, [1971] S.C.R. 493, 16
D.L.R. (3d) 715, [1971] 1 W.W.R. 289, the Supreme Court of Canada held that, in certain
circumstances at least, a broker will be regarded as the agent of the insurer.
4 There is a section similar to s. 197 in the automobile insurance part of the Act; see s. 202
which provides:
202. No person carrying on the business of financing the sale or purchase of automo-
biles and no automobile dealer, insurance agent or broker and no officer or employee of
such a person, dealer, agent or broker shall act as the agent of an applicant for the purpose
of signing an application for automobile insurance.
4 5 See s. 342(12).
19 For example, it is rightly pointed out (Report vol. 2, p. 33) that s. 159 is defective in only al-
lowing a two-year limitation period to an insured to whom material facts have been misrepre-
sented by the insurer. But the Report does not deal adequately with the question of remedies.
The Report would allow the insured the right to avoid the contract but it does not discuss the
availability of the remedy of rectification, which may be a crucial remedy for the insured.
Similarly, the discussion of s. 342(6) is inadequate. As the Report points out (vol. 2, p. 38)
that subsection allows an insurer to withdraw an agent's sponsorship merely by notifying the
superintendent and giving him reasons for the termination. The Report rightly points out that
this is an unsatisfactory state of affairs but it does not outline an alternative procedure to give
the agent more protection.
0 A policy may be terminated during its currency by the insurer giving to the insured "fifteen
days' notice of termination by registered mail or five days' written notice of termination per-
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is no explanation as to why the Insurance Act deals with, say, the prob-
lem of insurable interest in life in some detail, 5" but does not deal with
the complicated and unsatisfactory rules relating to insurable interest in
property .52
2. The Regulation of Intermediaries
The Report takes the view that the present regulatory system is re-
sponsible for a number of ills. One of these ills is said to be the high
cost of selling. The Report states that: "Commission rates alone in
auto and property insurance range between 7% and 25% of premiums,
with more business done at the higher end of that range. It seems rea-
sonable to hope the industry might increase its efficiency if the regula-
tory system were altered to allow competitive pressures to be exerted
more effectively on selling costs." 5 3 It is impossible to believe that if
the minimal regulatory measures requiring the licensing of interme-
diaries were to be abolished the cost of selling would be reduced. In-
deed, the truth is, as the Report recognizes elsewhere, that: "Insurers
using general agents find themselves unable to switch out of the gen-
eral agency system to try other methods without risking the loss of
large amounts of their present business." ,5 4
Even more fantastic is the contention that: - "Applications of com-
puter technology, standardized contract terms and disclosure, and...
low-cost distribution systems" are inhibited by the present regulatory
system. 55
Another alleged evil of the regulatory system is that it "prompts in-
termediaries to act contrary to the interest of the consumer". 56 Why a
sonally delivered;" see s. 122 stat. con. 5 (fire insurance); s. 205 stat. con. 8 (automobile in-
surance); s. 249 stat. con. 6 (accident and sickness insurance). The Report does not even con-
sider the question of providing for a cooling-off period for consumers who are the victims of
high-pressure salesmanship.
5 See ss. 152 and 153. The Report might have done well to examine the rationality of some of
these provisions. What is the purpose, for example, of allowing someone to take out insurance
on the life of "his child or grandchild" (s. 153(a))? Also, what is gained by allowing someone
to take out insurance on another's life provided that: "the person whose life is insured has con-
sented in writing to the insurance being placed on his life" (s. 152(2)(b))?
52 See e.g., Howard v. Lancashire Ins. Co. (1885), 11 S.C.R. 92 (insurable interest required
both at the time of taking out a policy and at the time of loss), and Guarantee Co. of North
America v. Aqua-Land Exploration Ltd., [196t] S.C.R. 133, 54 D.L.R. (2d) 229 (narrow defi-
nition of insurable interest).
5 See Report, vol. 3, p. 19.
5' See Report, vol. 3, p. 51.
5 See Report, vol. 3, p. 31.
5 See Report, vol. 3, p. 6.
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system of licensing should encourage intermediaries to act against the
interests of buyers of insurance is beyond my comprehension. The real
problem here may well lie with the method of remuneration adopted by
insurance companies. As Professor Kimball has pointed out: - "Per-
haps compensation by commission is inconsistent with real profession-
alism. On how many occasions does an agent now advise his potential
client to buy his insurance elsewhere?"T5 7
The truth of the matter is that the present system of regulation is in-
adequate. As the Report states elsewhere agents are, for the most part,
"poorly trained and educated individuals", 8 who have to pass an ex-
amination that is based on a "minimum level of product knowl-
edge". 59 Those who are impatient of examinations can, if they can
find three reputable citizens to vouch for them, set themselves up as
brokers. Those who are impatient of any public regulation at all can set
themselves up as "consultants".
None of these intermediaries, whether they be agents, brokers or
consultants, is required to carry liability insurance. This is a frighten-
ing situation in view of the fact that the courts have recently been im-
posing high standards of care for intermediaries at the same time as
they have been refusing to hold companies vicariously liable for the
negligence of their agents. 60
The Report fails to make any mention at all of the two very serious
restrictions imposed by the industry on the selling of insurance. These
restrictions have now found their way into the Insurance Act. In the
first place, no life insurance agent can be licensed to act as an agent for
more than one insurer transacting life insurance. 6 Second, an insur-
ance broker cannot negotiate a life insurance contract. 62 These restric-
tions mean that it is impossible for the prospective buyer of life insur-
ance to get skilled independent advice.
51 See Kimball and Rapaport, "What Price 'Price Disclosure'? - The Trend to Consumer Pro-
tection in Life Insurance", Wis. L. Rev. 1025 (1972), at p. 1032; see also the article by Pro-
fessor Norman Cameron advocating that "agents be paid more by fixed salary and less by
commission than at present"; Permanent Life Insurance and the Public Interest, Canadian
Forum, July 1975, 14, 17.
51 See Report, vol. 1, p. 19.
59 Ibid.
60 See e.g., Menna v. Guglietti (1970), 10 D.L.R. (3d) 132, [1970] 2 O.R. 146 (H.C.J.) (action
against agent only for failure to procure policy) and Fine's Flowers Ltd. v. General Accident
Assurance Co. (1974), 49 D.L.R. (3d) 641, 5 O.R. (2d) 137 (H.C.J.) (action against agent
only for failing to procure adequate policy).
61 See s. 342(5).
62 See s. 344(1).
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Finally, there is the restriction imposed by s. 357(1) of the Insur-
ance Act - the so-called "twisting" section. As is well known, this
section makes it an offence for anyone to persuade (or attempt to per-
suade) a policyholder to give up an existing policy for another policy
even if, as a result of the change of policies, it can be shown that the
insured would save a substantial amount of money. It cannot be argued
that it is only in very exceptional circumstances that an insured will
benefit from a switch from one policy to another. As Kimball and
Jackson have pointed out,
. . . sample calculations made for us by a competent actuary suggest that there are
a surprisingly large number of potential cases in which a "twist" would clearly
be beneficial to the policyholder, if the agent of a low-cost company twisted the
policy of a high-cost company.
6 3
The Carruthers Report would like to see the law on "twisting" revised
but, even with this revision,64 it would still be impossible, because of
the restrictions mentioned earlier, for a consumer to get skilled inde-
pendent advice regarding life insurance.
The Carruthers Report would restructure the organization of inter-
mediaries so that an intermediary would be forced to choose between
becoming a broker and becoming a "sales representative". The term
"agent" would disappear. The broker would be remunerated by the
buyer of insurance, whereas the sales representative would be remun-
erated by his company. Prima facie, the change appears to be a desir-
able one but, unfortunately, there remain some grounds for scepticism
on how much good the proposed change will achieve. In the first
place, unless the restriction on brokers placing life insurance is re-
moved, the value of the change is seriously undercut. Second, al-
though the broker is to be paid by the buyer of insurance, there seems
to be nothing in the Report which would prevent the broker from also
receiving commissions from the insurer. If this is the case, the insur-
ance buyer would be the victim of a cruel hoax. The purpose of requir-
ing the buyer to remunerate the broker is to assure the buyer that he is
dealing with someone who is putting his (the buyer's) interest fore-
most. If commissions can be paid by the insurer, then the insured no
longer has that assurance. Further, if the broker can receive both com-
missions and remuneration this may result in additional selling costs
63 See their article, "The Regulation of Insurance Marketing, 61 Col.L.R. 141 (1961), at
pp. 193, 194.
64 See Report, vol. 2, pp. 45-6 where it is recommended that only "twists" which are to the
advantage of the insured, should be allowed.
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which the Report tells us are already unreasonably high.6 5 Third,
under the existing law, there is no need for a broker to show anyone.
that he has access to a substantial section of the insurance market.
Nothing in the Report would change this. Thus a broker can (and under
the Report's recommendations would) continue to be able to hold him-
self out as an independent adviser, despite the fact that he had access to
only a very few companies. What a prospective broker should be re-
quired to prove, to the satisfaction of a public official, is that he can
place insurance with a large number of insurers.
Fourth, it is troubling that brokers are not required to show even the
minimum level of knowledge of insurance which agents are required to
demonstrate.
Fifth, so long as the present system of compensation by commission
continues, one must expect the high drop-out rate among agents--es-
timated by the Report to be in excess of 40% per annum 66 to persist.
It is very doubtful if a sales force with such a high turnover can de-
velop any great expertise.
Finally, recruitment and training programmes for agents will con-
tinue to be biased towards the interest of the company with little regard
being paid to the interests of consumers. What is needed is a publicly
approved system of training and education for intermediaries which
emphasizes the duties of intermediaries towards consumers. 6 7 As Pro-
fessor Kimball has observed: - "Life insurance exists basically to
serve the public welfare and only incidentally to provide a livelihood to
agents and a profit to life insurance companies" 68
The Carruthers Report also recommends that disciplinary powers
over intermediaries should be exercised by a Self-Regulatory Council
(S.R.C.) which is to exercise the powers previously exercised by the
superintendent. I find the whole idea of the Self-Regulatory Council
impossible to understand. Self-regulation is usually understood to
mean that extra-legal sanctions (for example, expulsion from an asso-
ciation or bad publicity)69 will be employed instead of traditional legal
65 See footnote 53, supra.
6 See Report, vol. 1, p. 19.
e The Report in vol. 1, p. 23 states that one of the issues to be considered is "government in-
volvement in training" at least to the extent of the "Approval of course material", but the mat-
ter is not discussed again in the rest of the Report.
68 See Kimball and Rapaport, op. cit., footnote 57, at p. 1026.
69 This kind of self-regulation (reliance on extra-legal sanctions) is used to control the behaviour
of intermediaries in the United Kingdom.
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sanctions such as fines or the cancellation of a licence. The Carruthers
sytem of self-regulation will apply traditional legal sanctions but it will
be self-regulatory because the sanctions will be imposed by representa-
tives of the insurance industry association who will be assisted by
"some representatives of the public interest". 7 0 No reason of any kind
is given for taking the disciplinary functions away from the superin-
tendent and giving them to the S.R.C. There is a good argument for
giving a body such as the Ontario Insurance Agents' and Brokers' As-
sociation standing as an advisory body to the superintendent. Simi-
larly, a group of consumers (e.g., the Consumers' Association of Can-
ada) should be given a similar advisory status. The danger with any
group policing itself is that enforcement of the rules will be too lax,
and, since there is no evidence that the superintendent is not enforcing
the rules adequately, it is suggested that the idea of the Self-Regulatory
Council should be rejected."l
In short, the Report's recommendations on intermediaries do not
seem well thought out and they should not be implemented.
3. Price Disclosure in Insurance
The Carruthers Report supports the idea of price disclosure but the
method used is the discredited net-cost price measurement. The Report
would require the insurer to disclose:
Total amounts the insurer expects to pay out
Expected benefit =
Total premiums the insurer expects to receive 72
This method is seriously misleading because it ignores the enormously
important interest factor. Consequently, some very harsh things have
been said about this method of disclosure. Professor Kimball has ob-
served that the use of this method can reach the absurd conclusion
" that the average price per $1,000 of life insurance coverage is
71 See Report, vol. 4, p. 36. It is not stated what the proportion of "public interest" to insurance
industry association members would be.
7' The Self-Regulating Council would also (see Report, vol. 4, p. 36) be responsible for "testing
individuals for educational and other qualifications." Since we are told elsewhere in the Re-
port that most intermediaries are "poorly trained and educated individuals" (Report, vol. 1,
p. 19), one can only view this prospect with alarm.
72 See Report, vol. 3, p. 40.
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negative". 7 3 Another critic has described this technique as "a neat bit
of arithmetic razzle-dazzle . . . .discredited years ago".
Using a complicated method which I will not reproduce here, Pro-
fessor Belth, of the University of Indiana, has devised a formula which
enables the buyer to be told how much he is paying for every $1,000 of
insurance . 5 It is suggested that a formula such as the one devised by
Professor Belth should be used.
The Carruthers Report seems to assume that a single method of price
disclosure can be used for all kinds of insurance. It is impossible to be-
lieve that the same method of price disclosure can be used for such
widely differing contracts as, say, life insurance and fire insurance.
There is another difficulty with the Carruthers' proposals for disclo-
sure. The cost of insurance is to be made available to the buyer of in-
surance when the contract is entered into. In my view, the buyer
should be made aware of the cost of insurance before he enters into the
contract. If price disclosure is to be made available only when the con-
tract is entered into, the buyer will have no effective choice since most
buyers, at least in the case of life insurance, will tend to feel "locked"
into the choice they have made. What is needed is for every insurer and
every intermediary selling insurance to have available a Shopper's
Guide to Life Insurance similar to the one put out by Professor Den-
nenberg when he was Commissioner of Insurance in Pennsylvania.7 6
The law could then make it an offence for an insurer or intermediary to
sell life insurance without first making available to the prospective
buyer a copy of the Shopper's Guide and allowing him time to study
it. 77
The Carruthers Report also falls into the danger of giving too much
information. Among the things insurance companies would have to
disclose are:
. ..stringency or liberality of the insurer in accepting an insured into a given risk
r See Kimball and Rapaport, op. cit., footnote 57, at p. 1038.
T' Urban Lehner, "The Case for the Extended Family: Life Insurance Today", Washington
Monthly (April, 1973), at p. 32, quoted in Ellen Roseman, Consumer Beware! (Toronto, New
Press, 1973), at p. 95.
r See his article, "Price Disclosure in Life Insurance", Wis. L. Rev. 1054 (1972), esp. at
pp. 1064-6.
76 See Pennsylvania Insurance Commission, Shopper's Guide to Life Insurance (1972). The
Guide revealed inter alia that there was a 170% spread between the lowest and highest-priced
life insurance policies of comparable value, with many of the largest and best known com-
panies' policies being the most expensive; see the Guide at pp. 14-5.
7 Alternatively, and/or additionally, the law could provide that a consumer who was not given a
copy of the Guide might be able to avoid the contract and recover his premiums.
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class [and] stringency or liberality of the insurer's claims settlement prac-
tices. .. 78
It is difficult to see what is gained by giving information such as "80%
of our risks are accepted at normal rates" or "we settle 98% of our
claims without resort to litigation and on average we pay claims in 137
days". In the first case, the insured will only want to know how much
he is paying for $1 ,000 of insurance; information as to rating practices
are, at best, unnecessary and, at worst, misleading. Similarly, the fact
that a company settled 98% of its claims without resort to litigation and
that it paid claims after (an average) delay of 137 days tells the insured
nothing about the fairness of a company's settlement practices. 79
The problem created by excessive information has been forcefully
put by Professor Leff:
What does seem to me to be critically important to recognize from the beginning
is that more information does not necessarily mean a better aggregate message.
* . . too much information on a wavelength causes static. The new messages not
only fail to get through, but garble the intelligible and relevant messages already
there; and one of the normal results of sensory overload in a commercial context
is impulse buying.8"
The Carruthers Report also recommends that exclusions from cover-
age should be clearly indicated in the policy.81 The buyer of life insur-
ance may be left with some impossibly difficult decisions. Suppose a
buyer has a choice between two policies A and B. The buyer would
save $120 a year in premiums if he bought policy A but policy A con-
tains an exclusion for death "caused by drowning", 8 whereas policy
B does not. The prospective buyer discovers, say, that an adult's
chances of dying by drowning are one in several million. How does a
rational adult decide, given these facts, which policy to buy? The truth
78 See Report, vol. 4, p. 97.
19 If we want publicity focused on delinquent companies, there are better ways of doing this. For
one thing, the superintendent could publish periodic reports showing which ten (or twenty)
companies have had the most complaints (in relation to premium income) during a certain
period.
80 See his article, "The Pontiac Prospectus", 2 Consumer Jour. 25 (1974), at p. 30.
61 See Report, vol. 3, p. 44.
82 Among other exclusions I have discovered in studying life insurance policies are, for example,
death caused by "infection of any nature unless occurring simultaneously with or in conse-
quence of, an accidental cut or wound". Another exclusion relates to death caused by "the
taking, administration, inhalation or absorption of any poison, drug, medicine, gas or fumes,
voluntarily or involuntarily, accidentally or otherwise".
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of the matter is that no one should be forced to make such a decision."
No valid social interest is being achieved by excluding death by
"drowning" and other like causes of death. The exclusion is as arbi-
trary as if the insurer excluded deaths which occurred on Saturdays.
The need to require insurance companies to justify the reasonableness
of each exclusion from coverage becomes more urgent when it is re-
alized that an increasing amount of life (and other) insurance is being
bought on a group basis. 84 In the group contract, the choice of what
contract to buy is not made by the insured who will not even get a copy
of the contract. 85 Before any "application [form], policy, endorse-
ment" for automobile insurance can be used it must be approved by
the superintendent. 6 If this degree of protection is extended to a fairly
simple contract, it is impossible to see why the same protection cannot
be given in the case of a life insurance contract which is a far more
complex transaction and is one where the investment by an individual
may well exceed the amount spent on automobile policies. It is sug-
gested that, at a minimum, every exclusion in a life or accident policy
(whether individual or group) should have to receive the express sanc-
tion of the superintendent. 87 For other classes of insurance it might not
be necessary or practicable to have the approval of the superintendent
in every case. Perhaps it will be enough to give the courts the power to
delete unreasonable and unfair clauses, a power they already have in
the case of fire insurance. 8
In short, while it is difficult to quarrel with the idea of price disclo-
1 This is not to say that a buyer of life insurance is acting irrationally when he consciously buys a
more expensive policy. Such a buyer may decide to pay more and be insured with a well-es-
tablished company rather than with a newly-established company which has a bad complaints
record.
11 In 1972, according to the Report (vol. 1, p. 28), individuals paid 480 million dollars for life
insurance whereas premiums for group life insurance came to 172 million dollars. The figures
for pensions and annuities, and for accident and sickness insurance show that the premium in-
come for group insurance is in excess of premium income for individual insurance.
'5 The courts seem to be recognizing that extra protection for the insured is needed in the case of
group life insurance; see e.g., Bohl v. Great-West Life Assurance Co. (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d)
584, [19741 1 W.W.R. 700 (Sask. C.A.) (holding that employer is agent of the insurer for pur-
poses of misrepresentation in an application for group life insurance) and Lund v. Great-West
Life Assurance Co., [1976] 3 W.W.R. 245 (Sask. Q.B.) (a decision construing an exclusion
clause in a group life policy out of existence).
86 R.S.O. 1970, c. 224,s. 201(1).
87 There would also appear to be a very strong argument for giving the superintendent power to
police sickness and disability policies as well, since sickness and accident policies are often
written together.
88 See s. 125(b) and also cases noted in footnote 11, supra.
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sure in insurance, 89 the Carruthers Report does not compel meaningful
price disclosure. Such disclosure as would be given would, in my
view, be given too late. In addition, the consumer would be given
some useless information which might have the effect of confusing
him. All in all, there is a need to make a completely fresh start.
4. The Use of Arbitration to Resolve Insurance Disputes
The Insurance Act provides, by virtue of s. 102, for a system of ar-
bitration to determine the quantum of the amount in dispute. The Car-
ruthers Report would like to see the system of arbitration so that the ar-
bitrator can "deal with more than the mere quantum of the loss".90 In
my view, there are very serious dangers in extending the use of arbitra-
tion in this way. First, since an arbitrator's main clients will tend to be
insurance companies, 9" there is a danger that an arbitrator will de-
velop a bias - albeit an unconscious one - in favour of insurers. Sec-
ond, questions of insurance law may sometimes be as complex as, say,
a difficult problem in tax law, and an ad hoc arbitrator might not be
competent to deal with the matter. When a difficult matter is presented
to a court, there is at least a guarantee of some competence. Third, an
insurer arguing before an arbitrator is more likely to plead a technical
defence9" than will be the case where the matter is heard before a pub-
lic tribunal. Fourth, a consumer who has a valid claim may find that he
recovers nothing because he has to pay his own costs.93 Fifth, an in-
sured who wants to argue a legal point before an arbitrator will be un-
able to get legal aid.
I would recommend that legally trained officials should be ap-
s9 As might be expected, the usual arguments about the cost of disclosure and the impossiblity of
making meaningful price comparisons have been used. For a review of some of the objections,
see Kimball and Rapaport, supra, footnote 57, at pp. 1026-35.
90 Report, vol. 3, p. 62.
91 Without endorsing the present system of grievance arbitration in labour disputes, it should be
pointed out that, at least in that context, the union sometimes exercises a veto over the em-
ployer's choice of an arbitrator.
92 In 1957, the British Insurance Association and Lloyd's underwriters agreed that "in general"
they would not use arbitration clauses to dispute questions of liability as opposed to questions
of quantum. See Law Reform Committee, Fifth Report, Cmnd. 62, paras. 10, 13. This con-
cession was made because it was felt that some insurers were using the arbitration system to
raise technical defences.
91 I am indebted to my colleague, Professor Martin Teplitsky for emphasizing the importance of
this point to me.
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pointed to the superintendent's office. These people would decide
questions of quantum as well as legal questions brought to them by
consumers. 94 Unless the dispute involved a particularly difficult ques-
tion of law, legal representation should not be allowed. Appeals would
lie from these officials, who would have the same tenure and be paid
the same remuneration as Judges of the Supreme Court, to the Court of
Appeal on questions of law. A body constituted along these lines
would seem to offer the advantages of expertise and impartiality-ad-
vantages which seem to be conspicuously absent in a system of ad hoc
arbitration.
Conclusion
For those people who are unaware of some of the controversial
issues in insurance regulation, the Carruthers Report might serve as the
basis for an introduction. As a foundation for future public policy, the
Report is, without doubt, a failure. If its recommendations were to be
implemented, nothing of value would be achieved and there is the
danger that many people would be under the illusion that significant
and beneficial changes had been made.
' I would make this tribunal a "consumer" court, because I do not perceive the same dangers
which are inherent in the arbitration system for consumers, as existing when the dispute is be-
tween an insurance company and a commercial concern. If I am wrong in this, the jurisdiction
of the insurance court could easily be extended.
